The number of troops constituting that presence also caused controversy in London. The COS used the collapse of the Bevin-Sidky agreement as a reason to slow evacuation from the Canal Zone, and on 30 April 1947, some 169,000 British personnel remained there, including 75,300 British servicemen, 20,600 non-United Kingdom troops under British command, and 73,000 Axis prisoners employed as laborers while awaiting repatriation. Take into account, you have an opportunity to buy help to write a dissertation
and receive your professional dissertation written by dissertation writers! Because this number greatly exceeded the 10,400 permitted by the 1936 treaty, Attlee feared that the Security Council might invalidate the treaty on the grounds of British noncompliance. He consistently pressed the COS to reduce the size of the force, but they dragged their feet, citing tactical impediments to the evacuation of men and stores. On 31 August 1947, 126,600 British personnel remained in Egypt.
In early 1947, American officials remained uninformed about the British determination to retain base rights in the Canal Zone. They assumed that, in addition to departing Greece, Turkey, and Palestine, British forces would leave the Canal Zone by September 1949, as provided by the Bevin-Sidky accord. The belief in an impending British departure from Egypt contributed to the American decision to launch the Truman Doctrine in early 1947, a point missed by most historians of the origins of the doctrine. After the Truman Doctrine was launched, Under Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and Director of the Office of European Affairs H. Freeman Matthews expressed their concern that Britain's retreat from Egypt, coupled with its other withdrawals, would leave it in "a spectator role in a contest between the US and the USSR." Only then did Daniel Lascelles of the Foreign Office assure American Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas that the British intended to stay in the Middle East and would oppose Egypt's efforts to expel them from the Canal Zone.
Once Egypt commenced its formal appeal to the Security Council, Foreign Office officials sought American assistance in dissuading Cairo from that course. London apparently first appealed covertly to the United States. Navy intelligence officers acquired a copy of a secret British policy paper so friendly in tone that William A. Eddy suspected that it had been "planted with our source for U.S. consumption." online editing essays
are delivered by experienced editors for university students. We hire the best editors! Britain "appreciates what the United States has already done to help" settle the Anglo-Egyptian impasse, the pa per stated. "She believes that the United States can be of further indirect help by discouraging any Egyptian attempt to obtain United States support against Great Britain over the Sudan question or to play one country off against the other." In late March, the Foreign Office explicitly asked for American support in this matter. R. D. J. Scott-Fox, head of the Egyptian Department, suggested that S. Pinckney Tuck, the American ambassador in Cairo, warn King Farouk, Prime Minister Mahmoud Nokrashy, and Egyptian army officers that an appeal to the United Nations would be "in for a rough time and will not receive US support."